Papers
"Can We Be Reasonable? Bias, Skepticism, and Public Discourse" (with Michael P. Lynch). Forthcoming in N. Ballantyne and D. Dunning (Eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A longstanding and influential thought is that for democracies to function well—or perhaps to function at all—they need vigorous but reasonable public discourse. The ideal is that they should be spaces of reasons—spaces where reasons for policy decisions can be exchanged and listened to. Yet there is mounting evidence suggesting that not only are human beings subject to biases and errors in reasoning, but we are also particularly bad at spotting when they are affecting us. As a result, one might suspect that we should be deeply skeptical about whether public discourse can ever be reasonable. In this chapter, we follow this suspicion to its logical conclusion, raising a novel skeptical argument based on the problem of what we’ll call “bad bias.” This skeptical argument, we believe, raises a serious challenge to the possibility of reasonable public discourse. Even so, reflection on the argument also points us toward new ways of confronting this challenge—a challenge that arguably goes to the heart of democracy itself.
Against the Purely Epistemic Point of View (in progress)
It is not uncommon for philosophers to invoke the purely epistemic point of view in their epistemological theorizing. For example, some philosophers invoke it in the hopes of settling disagreements about whether all true true beliefs (even true beliefs about trivialities) have epistemic value. Others invoke it in order to explain what makes epistemic obligations different from non-epistemic obligations. More generally, the "purely epistemic" has been prioritized in epistemology over perspectives or obligations that are partially social, moral, political, or practical. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, even if the purely epistemic point of view exists, it is not a point of view that we can actually occupy. So, it is simply a mistake to invoke it. Second, even if we can make sense of purely epistemic obligations (as distinct from, say, moral-epistemic or social-epistemic obligations), they should not be prioritized in our epistemological theorizing--at least not if we want to have an accurate sense of what our epistemic obligations actually amount to. The takeaway from this discussion is that the tendency to gravitate toward or prioritize the "purely epistemic" should be readily abandoned. Rather, the starting place for most (if not all) epistemological discussions should be heavily social in nature.
Dissertation — Engaging Others
We all have views on controversial issues: gun control, climate change, and abortion, to name a few. Due to the controversial nature of these issues, it can often be difficult to engage with those with whom we disagree. Precisely because of how much these issues matter, however, it is important to figure out whether and how we ought to engage. Aside from moral and political concerns, there are epistemic concerns. For instance, is open-minded engagement always epistemically responsible or required? The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the role that open-mindedness ought to play in our lives. Given that providing a comprehensive answer to the question of when we ought to be open-minded is incredibly complicated--especially when it comes to controversial issues--a secondary aim is to provide a framework for properly addressing the question at all. I argue that a serious exploration of the question of whether to be open-minded must also include a detailed discussion of epistemic normativity more generally. On the view I develop, what we ought to do epistemically is largely determined by what we ought to do morally, politically, and socially. This pragmatic approach to epistemic normativity is a decisive break from traditional lines of thought, according to which epistemic normativity ought to both be treated as distinct from, as well as theorized separately from, non-epistemic varieties of normativity. One important implication of my view is that, while we ought to be open-minded in general, the importance of being open-minded typically increases with the non-epistemic significance of the matter in question.
"Can We Be Reasonable? Bias, Skepticism, and Public Discourse" (with Michael P. Lynch). Forthcoming in N. Ballantyne and D. Dunning (Eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A longstanding and influential thought is that for democracies to function well—or perhaps to function at all—they need vigorous but reasonable public discourse. The ideal is that they should be spaces of reasons—spaces where reasons for policy decisions can be exchanged and listened to. Yet there is mounting evidence suggesting that not only are human beings subject to biases and errors in reasoning, but we are also particularly bad at spotting when they are affecting us. As a result, one might suspect that we should be deeply skeptical about whether public discourse can ever be reasonable. In this chapter, we follow this suspicion to its logical conclusion, raising a novel skeptical argument based on the problem of what we’ll call “bad bias.” This skeptical argument, we believe, raises a serious challenge to the possibility of reasonable public discourse. Even so, reflection on the argument also points us toward new ways of confronting this challenge—a challenge that arguably goes to the heart of democracy itself.
Against the Purely Epistemic Point of View (in progress)
It is not uncommon for philosophers to invoke the purely epistemic point of view in their epistemological theorizing. For example, some philosophers invoke it in the hopes of settling disagreements about whether all true true beliefs (even true beliefs about trivialities) have epistemic value. Others invoke it in order to explain what makes epistemic obligations different from non-epistemic obligations. More generally, the "purely epistemic" has been prioritized in epistemology over perspectives or obligations that are partially social, moral, political, or practical. In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, even if the purely epistemic point of view exists, it is not a point of view that we can actually occupy. So, it is simply a mistake to invoke it. Second, even if we can make sense of purely epistemic obligations (as distinct from, say, moral-epistemic or social-epistemic obligations), they should not be prioritized in our epistemological theorizing--at least not if we want to have an accurate sense of what our epistemic obligations actually amount to. The takeaway from this discussion is that the tendency to gravitate toward or prioritize the "purely epistemic" should be readily abandoned. Rather, the starting place for most (if not all) epistemological discussions should be heavily social in nature.
Dissertation — Engaging Others
We all have views on controversial issues: gun control, climate change, and abortion, to name a few. Due to the controversial nature of these issues, it can often be difficult to engage with those with whom we disagree. Precisely because of how much these issues matter, however, it is important to figure out whether and how we ought to engage. Aside from moral and political concerns, there are epistemic concerns. For instance, is open-minded engagement always epistemically responsible or required? The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the role that open-mindedness ought to play in our lives. Given that providing a comprehensive answer to the question of when we ought to be open-minded is incredibly complicated--especially when it comes to controversial issues--a secondary aim is to provide a framework for properly addressing the question at all. I argue that a serious exploration of the question of whether to be open-minded must also include a detailed discussion of epistemic normativity more generally. On the view I develop, what we ought to do epistemically is largely determined by what we ought to do morally, politically, and socially. This pragmatic approach to epistemic normativity is a decisive break from traditional lines of thought, according to which epistemic normativity ought to both be treated as distinct from, as well as theorized separately from, non-epistemic varieties of normativity. One important implication of my view is that, while we ought to be open-minded in general, the importance of being open-minded typically increases with the non-epistemic significance of the matter in question.
